Do people infer personality dispositions automatically when they encode behavior? TUlving's encoding-specificity paradigm was adapted to test three operational indicants of automatism: absence of intention, of interference from other mental activity, and of awareness. Recruited for a digit-recall study, subjects read sentences describing actions during the retention interval of either an easy or a difficult digit recall task. Later, sentence recall was cued by (a) disposition cues, (b) strong semantic associates to the sentence actor, or (c) words representing the gist of the sentence, or (d) sentence recall was not cued. Awareness was measured immediately after the last sentence was read. Disposition-cued recall was higher than (b) or (d) and was unaffected by digit recall difficulty. Awareness of making dispositional inferences was only weakly correlated with disposition-cued recall. Results suggest that disposition inferences occurred at encoding, without intention, without interference by differential drain on processing capacity, and with little awareness. Thus, making dispositional inferences seems to be largely, but not entirely, automatic.
Although inferences about people form the core of attributions and social cognition, social psychologists have only recently begun to inquire into how general or frequent these inferences actually are. Do they occur spontaneously and effortlessly, or must they be specially motivated? To what extent are people aware of making social inferences? The literature on person perception and social judgment contains contradictory assumptions about the cognitive nature of social inferences in general. One position presents such judgments as conscious and deliberate, the other as swift, sure, and even automatic.
For example, seminal theorists in person perception assumed the ease, even the inescapability, of such social inferences as impression formation and evaluation and asserted their ubiquity and centrality in everyday psy-chological functioning (Asch, 1946; Heider, 1944; Tagiuri, 1958) . Some recent approaches to social inference have argued for the spontaneity of attributional thinking (Smith & Miller, 1983; Winter & Uleman, 1984) .
In contrast, others imply or assert that social inferences are deliberate and effortful operations, requiring special motivating circumstances. Langer (1978) has described this view as picturing the individual "primarily as [an] information processor who... is cognitively aware most of the time and who consciously, constantly, and systematically applies rules to incoming information" (p. 35). KeDey and Michela (1980) discussed "motivation to make attributions" and asserted that "a person's interests . . . determine when he will become motivated to make attributions at all" (p. 473). Enzel and Schopflocher (1978) have criticized attribution research for using methods that instigate attributions that might not occur in real life, thereby inflating impressions of how common they are. Berscheid. Graaano, Monson, and Dermer (1976) asked, "Why is the perceiver sometimes willing to spend his time and energy in an effort to arrive at a causal understanding of another's behavior?" (p. 979). Also, Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) noted that "current conceptualizations . . . imply a highly rational inferential process by which the 904 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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attributor systematically samples and weights potentially relevant information before arriving at an explanation for an event" (p. 31). Surely social judgments may be conscious and occupy attention. However, a model of ordinary social judgments has developed that implicitly assumes that they usually occupy attention, require eifort, and give rise to conscious awareness (at least of their final products). We suggest that this model exaggerates how intentional, effortful, and conscious attributional processes are.
Automatic Processes
The topic of attentional or conscious processes has itself been the focus of recent research in information processing. Cognitive processes may be conceptualized along a continuum of attentional requirements. Those operations requiring substantial processing capacity are called conscious strategies (Posner & Snyder, 1975) or controlled processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . Although researchers have somewhat different characterizations of automatic processes, three central criteria presented by Posner and Snyder are represented in each treatment. Such processes occur without intention, without giving rise to awareness, and without interfering with other ongoing mental activity. They also identified conscious processing with a limited capacity mechanism that may be directed toward different types of activity. In their view, most cognitive tasks combine automatic activation with conscious strategies. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) have presented a unified model for selective attention, short-term search, and the detection and recognition of targets. Logan (1979) has studied the development of automatism using a concurrent memory load technique.
A few social cognition researchers have used the terms automatic and passive to characterize the psychological processes under their investigation (Higgins & King, 1981; Langer, 1978; Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, & Winkler, 1979) . Bargh and his associates have provided the most direct demonstrations of automatic social information processing, using auditory and visual stimuli of which their subjects were unaware (Bargh, 1982 (Bargh, ,1984 Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tola, 1985; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh & Thein, in press ).
This suggests that social inferences based on stimuli of which people are aware may also satisfy one or more automatism criteria. In particular, people may make such inferences without intentions to do so, without special motivating conditions, and without awareness of doing so or of the cognitive results. Two recent studies by Winter and Uleman (1984) indicate that this may be the case. The present research involves a closer examination of these encoding-specific inferences and their intentionality and awareness and a test of whether these inferences are interfered with by concurrent processing demands.
Spontaneous Encoding-Specific Inferences
The present research used a theoretical framework and a design developed by Winter (1980; Winter & Uleman, 1984) . Based on the notion of episodic memory organization (Tulving, 1972) and an adaptation of Tulving's encoding specificity paradigm (Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving & Osier, 1968; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) , that research indicated that inferences about personality can be part and parcel of the encoding of behavioral information, engaged in spontaneously (i.e., without instructions or other unusual motivating conditions), rather than discrete operations dependent on information retrieval.
The encoding specificity principle postulates the time of an input's encoding as the primary determinant of its storage format and retrievability (Tulving & Thomson, 1973, p. 369) . Any information that is encoded at the same time as the to-be-recalled input should be an effective retrieval cue. Tulving's subjects studied lists of target words, like CHAIR, that were paired with weak semantic associates, like glue, and later were asked to recall the target words in the presence of either the input cue (glue), a strong semantic associate of the target (e.g., table), or no cue. Recall was best when the input cue was present.
If people make trait inferences when they observe behavior, those inferred traits should be stored with the behavioral information. Therefore, as part of the encoding context of the behavioral information, the attributed trait This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
itself should serve as a self-generated input cue. One can explore whether trait inferences occur at encoding by investigating the retrieval cue effectiveness, for the behavioral information, of subjects' most likely trait inferences. If upon reading "The accountant takes the orphans to the circus" subjects infer that the accountant is kindhearted, the word kindhearted should be an especially effective retrieval cue for the sentence. Disposition words' effectiveness as recall cues was established by comparison with noncued recall and also by comparison with the effectiveness of strong semantic associates to important sentence parts (e.g., numbers, a strong associate to ACCOUNTANT, and fun, a strong associate to TAKES TO THE CIRCUS). These semantic associates were included as a control for the possibility that the disposition cues' effectiveness might be due to a priori semantic associations to sentence words rather than to dispositional inferences. Thus, under only general memory instructions, subjects in the previous research (Winter & Uleman, 1984) were shown sentences describing human actions, each implying a particular personality trait. Later they recalled the sentences, cued by either the personality words representing a probable trait inference (kindhearted), a strong semantic associate to an important sentence word, or no cue. In the first experiment, semantic associates were to actors (ACCOVtfTMlT-numbers); in the second, they were to verbs or verb phrases (TAKES TO THE ClRCUS-fun). Results showed the disposition cues to be strongest, nonsignificantly stronger than the semantic associates to actors, significantly stronger than semantic verb associates, and much stronger than no cue.
These findings suggested that as each sentence was read, a social judgment was made spontaneously and stored in relation to the sentence information. Thus, at recall the personality word proved an effective retrieval cue because it promoted access to the memory location at which the behavioral information was stored. Correlations between disposition-cued recall and self-reports of making personality judgments, used as measures of how much subjects knew about their own thought processes, were all nonsignificant. Subjects were not aware of their own judgments.
Although these studies had not been designed as tests of automatism, these findings suggest that dispositional inferences may be instigated in the absence of intention and awareness. The issue is compelling because automatic processes possess characteristics that strongly argue for their generality and importance-characteristics such as unsuppressibility and unmodifiability. Hence, the spontaneous encoding paradigm was refined for the present study to address the three major indicators of automatism: absence of intention, interference, and awareness.
The Present Study
The fact that Winter and Uleman's (1984) subjects apparently made social inferences without instructions to do so suggests that the inferences were unintentional, but subjects may also have made dispositional inferences as a mnemonic device (even though they did not report using that strategy later). To rule out this possibility, we introduced a manipulation suggested by Logan's (1979) concurrent memory load technique. Subjects performed an irrelevant task, digit recall, which demonstrably involves the use of controlled strategies such as rehearsal. The sentences were presented as "distractors" in the interval between presentation of the numbers and their recall. Hence, subjects had no intention even to remember them.
The memory load technique is also useful for testing the absence of interference from other ongoing mental operations. This required varying the demands on processing capacity. Because the sentences were encoded in the retention interval of a digit recall task, this could be done by varying the difficulty of the digits. Half of the subjects were presented with more difficult sequences of multiple rather than single digits. Digit recall and ratings of task difficulty provided manipulation checks that these digit conditions produced differential demands on processing capacity.
Probing for awareness of making trait inferences required a more immediate and stringent test than had been used in Winter and Uleman's (1984) experiments, in which subjects' awareness was assessed after sentence recall. The interval between the process (i.e., trait inference) and report probe was at least 10 min. This gap would allow relevant information to be forgotten, confounding lack of awareness with failure to remember. The delay could also have permitted subjects to fill in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
their memories of process with a priori theories (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . Finally, the awareness probe questions were too general, asking subjects to generalize what they thought across all the sentences. To meet Ericsson and Simon's (1980) conditions for accurate introspective reports about cognitive processes, we elicited reports about a single sentence (the last in the set) immediately after subjects read it and before they were asked to recall the last sequence of numbers. Self-report accuracy was assessed by correlating subjects' self-reports with actual disposition-cued recall. The present experiment also introduced another kind of cue, an associate to the entire sentence. These gist cues summarized each sentence's action but were neutral with regard to personality.
Overview and Predictions
The experiment was ostensibly a study of recall for numbers in which subjects believed that the sentences served as distractors. Each of the 16 trials consisted of the presentation of a series of five numbers, shown one at a time on slides, with subjects instructed to read each aloud. These were followed by a single sentence, also shown on a slide and read aloud by the subject, and then immediate recall of the numbers. Half of the subjects received sequences of single digits, and the rest received sequences of multiple digits.
If subjects make trait inferences while trying to retain digit sequences, then the inference process must be unintentional. The hypothesis that disposition inferences are made without intention predicts that recall cued by the disposition words will be superior to noncued recall and at least as strong as recall cued by either the actor associates or the gist cues. The latter two comparisons are essential for eliminating the possibility that the disposition cues' effectiveness is actually due to strong a priori associations to sentences.
The prediction that trait inferences do not require awareness was tested by correlating self-reports of making trait judgments about the actors, elicited immediately after the last sentence was read, with actual disposition-cued recall.
The noninterference criterion for automatism predicts that memory load should have no effect on the extent to which subjects make dispositional inferences. Therefore, even though recall of the more difficult numbers should be worse than the single numbers, subjects at both levels of difficulty should show comparable rates of sentence recall cued by disposition words, because making a trait inference automatically should require little or no processing capacity. In effect, an interaction between digit recall and sentence recall was predicted, with digit recall declining in the more difficult condition and sentence recall remaining about the same.
Method
The present research comprised two parts: (a) pretests of the sentences and digit sequences and (b) the recall experiment.
Pretests
Pretest 1 identified sentences in a set of 28 that most reliably produced dispositional rather than situational attributions. Thirty-seven introductory psychology students described "what probably caused the event" in each. A response was scored 1 if it was totally dispositional and 3 if it was totally situational. 1 The 18 sentences that were most dispositional were chosen. The mean attribution rating was 1.63. The range was from 1.25 to 2.23. Two sentences were eliminated later on the basis of Pretest 4. Pretest 2 obtained the personality traits attributed most frequently to sentence actors. Thirty-two additional introductory psychology students answered the question "What kind of person is this?" with as many as three words for each of the 18 sentences. The most frequently given word was selected as the dispositional cue for that sentence.
Pretest 3 obtained gist cues. Sixty introductory psychology students were asked to "think of a word (for each of 18 sentences) which expresses the kind of activity that the sentence exemplifies. You might try to think in terms of a good title for a paragraph in which the sentence appears." The most frequently given word for each sentence was selected as the gist cue. Table 1 presents the 16 sentences finally selected and their gist cues, as well as the dispositional cues and the semantic associates to actors.
Pretest 4 estimated the associative strength between cues and sentences in a paired associates test in order to match the disposition and gist cues' associative strengths with the sentences. Pairs consisted of sentences (the targets) and either disposition cues or the gist cues derived in Pretest 3. Tested individually, 31 undergraduates heard a cue (e.g., helpful or assisting) on a cassette tape recorder, :
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("The tailor carries the old woman's groceries across the street"). About 5 s later the next cue was heard. Subjects were instructed to learn each cue-sentence pair in preparation for a recall test in a single pass through the set of cue-sentence pairs. Sentences were presented in the same order to all subjects. Half of them heard the even-numbered sentences preceded by the disposition cues, and half heard the oddnumbered sentences. During recall, cues were presented in a random order with a dilferent random order on each trial and unlimited time after each cue. When a subject could not remember the sentence, it was read aloud. The session terminated when the subject had recalled each sentence predicate at least twice consecutively. The trials to this criterion for each sentence were averaged over all subjects and are presented in Table 1 . Differences between disposition and gist cues' strength of association with each sentence were assessed via r tests (see Table 1 ). For six sentences, the gist cue was significantly stronger; for one sentence the disposition cue was stronger. Thus, we could not eliminate all sentences with unmatched cues, but statistical adjustments were planned, taking this discrepancy into account.
Pretest 5 established that recall of the two sets of digits differed in their demands on processing capacity. We also tested the credibility of verbal distractors inserted between the digit sequence. On each of eight trials, individually tested subjects heard a sequence of five to-be-remembered tape-recorded numbers, followed by three unrelated imagible nouns (from Winters & Brzoska, 1975) . They repeated each number and noun aloud and recalled the number sequence immediately after the last noun. Half of the subjects received a series of five single digits, and half received a sequence of three double and two triple digits. Two min after the last digit sequence was recalled, recall for the words was requested. Of the 40 numbers, subjects in the single-digit condition recalled 37.38, or 93.45%, and multiple-digit subjects recalled 14.33, or 35.83%, ((26) = 22.25, p < .001. Recall of the 24 nouns did not differ (3.92 vs. 3.20, respectively). All subjects found the digit recall task perfectly plausible and assumed that the nouns were distractors. None were suspicious of the task or reported trying to remember the nouns, and virtually all expressed surprise (and dismay) when asked to recall the nouns.
Recall Experiment
Subjects. Ninety-five volunteers from New York University's Introduction to Psychology course signed up for an experiment called "Memory for Digits" in partial fulfillment of course requirements.
Materials. Sixteen sentences were selected on the basis of the pretests described earlier. In each sentence, an actor denoted by an occupation (e.g., carpenter) performs an action that is described without referring to internal states like intention or affect. Digit sequences from Pretest 5, sentences, and the anagrams used in the distractor task were shown on slides projected by a Kodak Carousel Slide Projector. Recall sheets given to subjects after the distractor task presented recall instructions, the list of retrieval cues, and space in which to write recalled sentences.
Procedure. Subjects were run individually and were informed that they were participating in a study of memory for digits. Written instructions described the procedure up to the point of sentence recall. On each of 16 trials, a sequence of five numbers was shown. After the subject read each number aloud, the projector advanced to the next one. Following the fifth number, a single sentence was shown. The subject read the sentence aloud and then repeated it, looking away from the screen. Then the projector advanced to a blank slide, and the subject recalled the digits aloud. Ten s were allotted for recalling each number sequence.
All 16 trials were conducted this way except the last. As soon as the last sentence was spoken twice, the subject was asked to report what he or she thought about while reading it and then any thoughts about the actor or the action in the sentence. The subject then rated how much he or she had thought about visual images, word associations, who caused the event in the last sentence, and the actor's personality or personal qualities on 11-point scales. Recall for the last number sequence was then elicited, and a 2-min anagram distractor task was then performed. Twelve anagrams were presented, three on a slide, with a maximum of 1 min for each slide. Finally, the lights were turned up and the recall sheet was given to the subject, who wrote down all the sentences or parts of sentences that he or she could recall, using the cues provided. After 10 min, the recall sheet was collected and the subject was debriefed and thanked.
Results
Because each sentence consisted of an actor, a verb, an object, and a prepositional phrase (or in one case, a second object), recall was scored by giving up to 4 points per sentence. We used lenient scoring, with no extra credit for verbatim recall. A second coder scored the first 60 recall protocols; interrater agreement was 98%.
To determine recall cues' relative effectiveness and whether differential memory demands affected sentence recall, recall data were subjected to a split-plot factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). With the four cuing conditions, each block of four sentences was cued by a different type of recall cue for one quarter of the subjects in a Latin square. Thus, each sentence was cued by each type of cue an equal number of times, producing a four-level between-subjects factor called block-cue pairing. Block-cue pairing and memory load were between-subjects factors. Cue type and sentence part (actor, verb, object, or prepositional phrase) were within-subjects factors. This yielded a2X4X2X4X4 (Memory Load X Block-Cue Pairing X Sex X Cue Type X Sentence Part) design.
This initial ANOVA revealed main effects for cue type, F(3, 258) = 8.77, p < .001, and sentence part, F(3, 258) = 8.04, p < .001, and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Main effects and interactions were evaluated by tests of simple effects and protected / tests between pairs of means. As predicted, disposition cues (M = 0.99) were superior to semantic (M = 0.59) and no-cue (M = 0.50) recall, ft(94) = 8.71 and 7.86, ps. < .001. In addition, gist-cued recall (M = 0.90) was superior to semantic and no-cue recall, fs(94) = 3.15, p = .002, and 3.51, p = .001. Disposition and gist cues did not differ in retrieval effectiveness, nor did semantic cues and free recall. Thus, both disposition and gist cues were superior to the other cuing conditions.
The main effect for sentence part was due to better recall of objects (M = 0.84) than actors (M = 0.68), verbs (M = 0.76), and prepositional phrases (M = 0.71), /s(94) = 4.02, p = .001; 4.05, p = .001; and 4.57, p = .001, respectively. Verb recall was marginally better than actor recall, t(94) = 1.82, p = .07. Figure 1 shows the Cue Type X Sentence Part interaction and the results of significance tests. For actor recall, semantic cues were most effective. For verbs, objects, and prepositional phrases, dispositional and gist cues were most effective. Analyses within each cue type showed differences among sentence parts for all but noncued recall.
Analyses of the interaction between blockcue pairing and cue type revealed that disposition cues were particularly effective for the sentences that happened to be in Block 3, F(3, 91) = 7.17, p < .001, and gist cues were relatively ineffective for these sentences F(3,91) = 2.96, p = .04.
Disposition and Gist Cues
In the above analyses, dispositional retrieval cues were nonsignificantly superior to gist cues, and both were generally more effective than other cue types. In previous research, disposition cues were significantly more effective in cuing entire sentence predicates (verb + object + preposition) than were semantic associates to either the sentence actors (Winter & Uleman, 1984 sition cues retrieved entire sentences more effectively than verb semantic associates. This was interpreted as evidence that dispositions were inferred (at encoding) from the entire sentence, rather than being mere semantic associates to sentence parts. The present study's gist cues offer some control for disposition cues' possible advantage in cuing whole sentences, because they too were based on whole sentences. 2 There was a significant three-way interaction between memory load, cue type, and sentence part, F(9, 774) = 1.94, p = .044. Separate ANOVAS examined the Cue Type X Memory Load interactions for each sentence part and the Sentence Part X Memory Load interactions for each cue type. Interactions with memory load were significant only in the ANOVA for semantic-cued recall, F(3, 261) = 2.90, p = .036.
There were also marked differences in recall across sentences, and in the effectiveness of cues across sentences. To control for the variance due to sentences, an additional ANOVA was performed that included sentences as a 16-level factor. This analysis revealed that sentences did contribute significant variance to recall, F(15,1290) = 12.65, p < .001, implying that cued recall effects are not the same across all sentences. Nevertheless, cue type remained significant in this analysis, F(3, 258) = 8.75, p < .001. The same relations between recall means were obtained in this analysis too. Recall cued by disposition words (M = 3.98) and recalled cued by gist words (M = 3.58), though not differing significantly from each other, were higher than recall cued by either semantic actor associates (M = 2.37), M95) = 3.39. p < .001, and 3.03, p = .003, or no cues (M = 1.89), ;s(95) = 3.69, p < .001, and 3.73, p < .001. Hence, although sentences varied in recallability, cue type remained a powerful independent source of variance. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The above analyses assumed that disposition and gist cues were equally matched in strength of association with the sentences. From Pretest 5, however, we know that gist cues had stronger associations to some sentences (see Table 1 ). Although paired associates trials to criterion or probability of recall and free association strengths are not strictly comparable, they are closely related (Bahrick, 1969; Watkins & Gardiner, 1982) . Therefore, we performed a rough adjustment of the disposition and gist recall scores to take into account the differences in these cues' strength of association with sentences from Pretest 5. Disposition-cued recall scores were weighted by the ratio of disposition cues' trials to criterion to gist cues' trials to criterion (1.09). Gist-cued recall was weighted by the inverse.
Using these weighted scores, the difference between gist-and disposition-cued recall for both total sentences and predicates only was assessed by matched (tests. The adjusted disposition-cued recall of the total sentence (i.e., all four parts; M = 1.11) was marginally higher than that of adjusted gist-cued recall (M = 0.86), 1(94) = 1.84, p = .069. For predicates only, recall for disposition cues (0.92) was reliably higher than for gist cues (0.67), 1(94) = 2.30, p = .024. Hence, when a priori strength of association between sentences and cues is taken into account, the superiority of disposition cues emerges as significant in the case of the predicates only and as marginally significant for recall of total sentences.
Interference
The effectiveness of the memory load manipulation was assessed by I tests on digit recall and on subjects' ratings of the ease of the number-recall task. Difficulty level strongly affected the number of digits recalled, as Figure  2 shows. Of a possible 80 numbers, subjects in the single-digit condition recalled 68.89, or 86.11%, and those with multiple digits recalled only 29.21, or 36.51%, t(93) = 26.42, p < .001. Single-digit recall (5.73) was rated easier than multiple-digit recall (6.86) on a 10-point scale, /(91) = 3.21,p = .002.
The automatism criterion of noninterference from controlled processing was addressed by examining the effect of differential short- term memory load on dispositions' effectiveness in cuing sentence recall. The initial overall ANOVA described above showed that memory load made no difference in cued or noncued recall of sentences, F(l, 86) < 1. Interactions with both cue type and sentence part were also less than 1. Figure 2 depicts cued and noncued recall in the two memory load conditions, with the digit recall superimposed and scaled on the right-hand ordinate. It shows that differential memory load had no effect on subjects' spontaneous trait inferences, as measured by disposition-cued recall.
3
Note that none of the other three cuing conditions showed any effect of the memory load manipulation either. This might indicate either that all the association and inference processes were automatic or that no effective manipulation of processing capacity actually took place. Unfortunately, the design provides no direct measure of spare processing capacity, so it is not possible to exclude the latter possibility.
Awareness
Subjects' awareness of making trait inferences was assessed immediately after reading the final sentence.
On the initial open-ended question, only 18 subjects (19%) mentioned anything at all about the actor. Responses to the closed-ended questions about personality and causality-related thoughts were made on a scale on which 0 meant that the subject had had no such thoughts while reading the final sentence and 10 indicated that such thoughts had occurred a great deal. Low means (3.03 and 2.67, respectively) suggest that the incidence of such conscious thoughts was minimal. More important, however, responses to these questions were correlated with subjects' actual disposition-cued recall, with the recall data from the final sentence for each subject deleted. (A split-plot ANOVA and analyses of simple effects were also performed on these abridged recall data, with the final sentence deleted, corroborating the original results.) Disposition-cued recall correlated .18 (p = .09) with the open-ended response and .23 (p = .03) with the closed-ended question about personality. Thus, there was marginally significant evidence of some accurate introspective awareness of making dispositional inferences.
Discussion
The central purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which spontaneous encoding-specific inferences meet each of three characteristics of automatism: occurrence without intentions, without interference by other mental activity demanding processing capacity, and without awareness. Before discussing these, however, it is essential to establish that encoding-specific inferences did occur.
Dispositions were more effective sentence retrieval cues than were strong a priori semantic associates to key sentence words, even though the disposition cues' a priori associations to the sentence were weak or absent. In replicating previous findings of Winter and Uleman (1984) , this again suggests that subjects made inferences about actors' personalities upon reading behavioral descriptions of actors, thus linking the attributed traits in memory with the behavioral information on which the inferences were based. These new links, which pretesting had shown to be either weak or absent before the sentences were read, facilitated recall of sentences by promoting access to the behavioral information in episodic memory.
We have emphasized the importance of an "automatic encoding process [that] produces (over a short period of time, perhaps several hundred milliseconds) a large number of different types of informational features, organized by content," including category codes and concept codes (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984, pp. 58-59) . Of course, retrieval processes also affect recall, including inferences made from retrieval cues. At retrieval, cues narrow the search and provide a test for evaluating whether the retrieved item had been presented earlier. If recall depended primarily on such retrieval processes, though, semantic-cued recall in our studies would be superior to disposition-cued recall because of the semantic cues' stronger a priori associations with sentence parts (established in pretesting). That they were not points to the importance of encoding processes.
An analogy may be useful. Imagine looking for The Castle (the to-be-retrieved item) in the Library of Congress (long-term memory store) with and without the card catalogue system (encoding processes). Retrieval cues (fiction, by F. Kafka) could narrow the search set, depending on how the library was organized, and could confirm that the right book had been found. However, the cues would be much more effective if they were linked to the book when it was shelved (encoded) and referred to the book's address in the library. Without such a link at encoding, one would have to argue that our dispositional cues are as good as or better than the semantic cues at narrowing the search and testing its results. The pretests challenge the plausibility of this view. Surely inferences 4 We also examined possible sex differences in awareness.
Women (3.32) reported more causal thoughts than men (2.00), r(94) = 2.35, p --=-.022, but there was no difference in personality thoughts (3.34 and 2.72, respectively). Correlations between disposition-cued recall, deleting the last sentence, and the open-ended measure were .02 for men and .32 (p = .03) for women. Correlations with thoughts about causality were -.17 for men and .25 (p = .10) for women; with personality thoughts, they were .13 and 32 (p -.03), respectively. Thus, accurate introspective awareness was limited to women. made from recall cues at retrieval do play a role in recall, and in our findings, but it seems unlikely that they can account for the superiority or even equivalence of dispositions as recall cues in our paradigm.
How well did these encoding-specific trait inferences satisfy the three criteria of automatic processes? The criterion of absence of intention was clearly met without the ambiguity of previous studies. Subjects believed that the study concerned memory for digits and that the sentences were merely abstractors. Thus, they had no intent to remember the sentences and therefore no reason to engage in elaborative rehearsal that might generate dispositional inferences.
The results also appear to satisfy the criterion of absence of interference from ongoing mental operations, because disposition-cued recall was unaffected by the level of simultaneous demands on processing capacity, operationalized by the digit-retention task. These demand levels did seem to differ markedly between conditions according to the digit recall data and subjects' difficulty ratings.
An alternative interpretation of this predicted absence of effect on sentence recall is that processing capacity was not effectively manipulated. Spare processing capacity was not directly measured, and the single-digit sequences may have placed enough demands on processing capacity to create a ceiling effect. Another possibility is that subjects in the multiple condition, perceiving the task's difficulty early in the procedure, did not attempt to remember all five numbers in each sequence but contented themselves with recalling two or three. These possibilities temper our interpretation of these results and compromise the digit-retention task, by itself, as a completely convincing manipulation of processing capacity. Studies currently underway are attempting to address these issues.
The evidence for awareness of making trait inferences at encoding showed, unlike previous studies, some weak evidence of accurate awareness (but only among women; see footnote 4). Previous studies' awareness measures were obtained at least 10 min after the sentences had been read, after distractor anagrams and cued recall, rather than immediately after the last sentence was read. They also elicited awareness of inferences about the sentences in general rather than about a particular sentence. Thus, the present evidence indicates that whatever awareness exists of making trait inferences is relatively fleeting and that, only among women, it accounts for about 10% of the variance in the effectiveness of dispositioncued recall.
Overall, our results provide evidence that making one fundamental kind of social judgment, inferences about traits, can be initiated in a largely automatic way. They are certainly made without intentions while other intentional processing occurs. They seem to be at least difficult to interfere with and are unaffected by simultaneous variations in processing demands and capacity (though this evidence is open to alternative interpretations), and they occur with only weak and fleeting awareness, as shown by a measure that is both more immediate and more specific than those used previously. Initiating the process of making trait inferences is more automatic than has been demonstrated heretofore.
.It is also important to remember that most cognitive processes combine automatic and controlled processes. Our subjects devoted enough attention to the sentences to read them aloud twice. Our evidence suggests that the sentences, once read aloud and repeated, automatically engaged processes resulting in dispositional inferences. Such automatically engaged dispositional inference processing may then require some controlled processing for its consolidation and storage, even when it is unintentional. More effective interference methods and measures of cognitive capacity during sentence encoding will be required to assess the degree to which controlled processes may also be involved in spontaneous dispositional inferences.
The near-equivalence of the disposition and gist cues in recall raises a question about what the gist cues actually represent. Intended as semantic associates to whole sentences, they were derived from a free-associate style pretest, but they are more than ordinary semantic associates. Many represent the actor's intention (e.g., dieting, giving, welcoming, assisting), itself a kind of social judgment. It is not clear, then, that the comparison between gist and disposition cues represents the distinction beThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tween semantic associates and episodically based inferences. They may represent two kinds of social judgments. Another issue for future research is whether disposition-cued recall indicates the occurrence of personality inferences, as hypothesized, or just categorizations of actions. Our trait terms may characterize actions as much as, or more than, actors. Srull and Wyer (1979) have shown that specific action descriptions may prime such abstract categories as hostile and kind even without instructions to infer such categories from the descriptions. If disposition words also served as action categories, like our gist cues, this might imply that personal or disposition terms are simply good summary representations of sentences about persons. Our gist cues could not rule out this possibility, and it may not be possible with the present paradigm. However, one might substitute pictures effaces for the common nouns representing actors and measure recognition accuracy for faces paired with trait versus gist cues derived from the same actions.
Other interesting directions for future research are suggested by other criteria for automatism. For example, automatic processes cannot be suppressed, modified, or improved by instructions (e.g., Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981) , and our paradigm is being extended to ask similar sorts of questions about other social judgments, such as causal attributions.
What are the implications of the evidence that traits are inferred unintentionally, without interference, with little or no awareness, and are linked with the memory representations of the behavior on which they were formed? There is a literature that shows that the memorial status of information can bias subsequent social judgments as well as memory for events (Carlston, 1980; Higgins & Rholes, 1976; Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, & Geva, 1980) . Our results suggest that such effects may occur even without inference instructions and perhaps even without subjects' awareness that they have made inferences. Thus, behavioral evidence that implies clear dispositions may spontaneously affect subsequent judgments more than other, more diffuse or ambiguous evidence, because the inference itself is stored in memory and becomes an additional basis for subsequent judgments (Carlston's, 1980, model 3. Id, p. 90) . The present paradigm provides a way of testing this possibility directly.
In these models, social inferences serve both as "themes" (Ostrom et al., 1980 ) that organize memory and bias recall and as bases for subsequent social judgments themselves. The latter role may account for the poor correspondence often found between judgments of others and recall of their behavior (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben,Fiske,&Hastie, 1979) . There is also a poor correspondence between inferences and memory for their bases in the literature on attitudes and persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Himmelfarb, 1978; Greenwald, 1968; McGuire, 1969) . Here, too, spontaneous social inferences may occur about both the attitude object and the communicator (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1975) . If these decay more slowly than memory for the specifics of the message and the source's behavior or features, then attitudes and recall of specific message contents could easily become uncorrelated.
On the whole, early theorists' intuitions that social inferences may be ubiquitous are supported, as are the more recent suggestions by Smith and Miller (1983) and Anderson (1983) . Certainly trait inferences are not always effortful, attention-demanding cognitive operations or strategies. They can also occur without instructions or other special motivations such as the needs to explain novelty or failure (see Weiner, 1985) . As Jones (1979) suggested, the cognitive road from acts to dispositions is not so rocky after all. In fact, like a superhighway, it may often be traveled "on automatic." Manuscripts have been received in the editorial office for a number of months, but more than 50% of the original submissions have been experimental. The Editor, M. Powell Lawton, and the Associate Editor, Donald H. Kausler, wish to emphasize that Psychology and Aging will be a broad-ranging publication, and manuscripts from all areas of psychology are desired.
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